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This study analyzes how the Wagner Group’s behavior in various geographic locations 
has affected their fluctuating relationship with the Russian government and how it has 
changed over time. This research is important for policymakers and scholars alike 
because it provides insight into how the Russians conduct their foreign policy to 
accomplish their geopolitical objectives. The research reviews the Russian-Wagner 
relationship through the prism of the principal-agent theory. The study hypothesized that 
as the Wagner Group has become more dispersed in various locations around the world 
that it would act more independently of the stated objectives of the Kremlin. The data 
used for this research illuminated the complicated relationship between the Wagner 
Group and the Russian Ministry of Defense. The study further hypothesized that there 
would be a greater deal of turmoil within the principal-agent relationship between Russia 
and the Wagner Group than the data ended up showing. This study has shown that the 
Kremlin and Putin himself find many more benefits than costs by using the Wagner 
Group to achieve his foreign policy goals. Looking into the future, one should expect to 
see the continued proliferation of Private Military Companies (PMCs) like the Wagner 
Group to continue operating on behalf of  or in support of the Russian government’s 
geopolitical objectives.  
 
Primary Reader and Advisor: Dr. Sarah Clark 
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This study is based on the following question: How has the Wagner Group’s behavior in 
various geographic locations affected their relationship with the Russian government and 
how has it changed over time? This question is important for policymakers and scholars 
alike because it can provide insight into how the Russians conduct their foreign policy 
and through what means and tools they are likely to use to accomplish their geopolitical 
objectives. The research will analyze the relationship between the two through the prism 
of the principal-agent theory by looking at the behavioral changes of the agent (Wagner 
Group) and how it has affected Russia’s support for them in different locales. It seeks to 
answer how this relationship has fluctuated since the Wagner Group’s first appearance on 
the battlefields of eastern Ukraine in 2014. To understand the uniqueness of the Russian-
Wagner relationship, this study will review the conceptual framework of a principal-
agent of the relationship and seek to answer how the behavior of an agent can determine 
decisions by the principal. By analyzing how these two actors interact with one another in 
various locations around the world, the study will review the cost/benefit calculi of the 
Russian government.  
 
The study analyzes how the delegation of authority, or the lack thereof, from the Russian 
government to the Wagner Group changes over time and geographies. Furthermore, the 
study will analyze the Russian’s delegation of authority to Wagner and how it has used 
that authority to make decisions that have at times diverged from their principal’s 




relationship by analyzing it through the principal-agent framework and exploring what 




This analysis will describe the current literature that exists on the principal-agent theory 
and then define Private Military Contractor(s).  
 
Background on the Principal-Agent Theory 
 
The principal-agent theory was originally founded in rational choice theory and further 
elaborated upon by economic scholars. The model was used to explain business 
relationships and eventually these theories went from the economic to the political 
realm.1 The theory looks at control and accountability deriving from the delegation of 
responsibility from a principal to its agent (s).2 An agent is responsible for performing 
specific functions on their principal’s behalf. What is important about principal-agent 
analysis is that the conceptual framework has the ability to analyze not only the 
principal’s interests and strategies for the relationship, but also the agent’s interests.  
 
 
1 Hindmoor, Andy. “Rational Choice.” Theory and Methods in Political Science. New York. 2010. P. 43. 
2 Krahmann, Elke. “NATO contracting in Afghanistan: the problem of principal–agent networks.” 






Understanding the principal-agent theory will help one to understand why these 
relationships can become turbulent and difficult to manage. They are often fraught with 
distrust between the two parties, especially as interests diverge from one another. The 
theory helps to explain what can happen when the agent is allowed to make decisions on 
behalf of their principal and there becomes a divergence of priorities between the 
principal and its agent (s). Scholars such as Daniel Byman and Sarah Kreps have looked 
at the relationships between principals and their agents, specifically with regard to state-
sponsored terrorism. Although this research study looks at it from a state-private military 
company (PMC) perspective, the framework of the principal-agent relationship remains 
similar. An important difference to note though is that a state-sponsored terrorism 
relationship is likely to revolve around shared ethnicities, ideologies, or religion; whereas 
a state-PMC relationship may share common nationalities or political philosophies, but 
more importantly, this type of setup primarily revolves around profitmaking for the 
mercenary group and a multitude of other reasons for the principal which will be 
explored in this study. 
 
Additionally, the analysis of delegation of authority from the principal to its agent is key 
in understanding the changing dynamics of these relationships. According to Byman and 
Kreps, “Without the practice of delegation, no principal-agent relationship would exist.”3  
Byman and Kreps provide strong arguments for why principal-agent analysis has a 
greater ability to explain dynamics of international conflict. 
 
 
3 Byman, Daniel, Sarah Kreps. “Agents of Destruction? Applying Principals-Agent Analysis to State-




One of the key reasons principals employ their agents (PMCs) around the world is for the 
benefit of attempting to achieve their geopolitical goals while having some level of 
plausible deniability, although the deniability is generally weak. The concept of plausible 
deniability is important because it can cause confusion and deny the adversary the ability 
to make a clear connection between the activities of the agent and the intent of the 
principals4, according to Byman. Therefore, overt retaliation against the principal as a 
result of an agent’s actions may be more difficult politically for an adversary, further 
complicating their decision-making process. An obvious but important point to make is 
that no principal can constantly monitor their agents’ actions. This can often create 
friction between the two parties when the agent acts outside the expectations or 
preference of the principal. The risk that the agent will shirk its responsibilities, make a 
bad decision, or otherwise act in a way that is contrary to the principal’s best interest, can 
be defined as agency costs, which ultimately impact the principal’s legitimacy. One 
solution to reduce these agency costs within the principal-agent problem is for the 
principal to create incentives, generally financial, for the agent to act more appropriately 
in the principal’s interests.  
 
Tensions Between Principals and their Agents 
 
Principal-agent analysis was an easily transferrable conceptual framework from its 
origins in business and economic studies to geopolitics because the same types of 
relationships exist between two parties whether they are licit or illicit. The bedrock of the 
 
4 Byman, Daniel, Sarah Kreps. “Agents of Destruction? Applying Principals-Agent Analysis to State-




principal-agent relationship is grounded in the delegation of authority, because its 
existence requires the transfer of some level of decision-making authority from the 
principal to its agent. That transfer of delegation immediately raises the likelihood that an 
agent may act or behave in a way that is contradictory to the preference of the principal.5 
Despite this common problem, principals find delegation helpful in order to reduce their 
own costs, increase efficiencies, or gain access to expertise it did not have within its own 
organization.6 These factors can explain the tensions that exists between principals and 
their agents. First, principals can find it difficult to ensure or even enforce that their 
agents act in their preferred way. Second, principals and agents often have divergent 
interests. One example of this divergence is that principals are generally seeking to 
reduce their overall costs, while agents are aiming to maximize their profitability.7 Third, 
principals may attempt to delegate blame to their agents when things may go wrong. 
Furthermore, agents may attempt to expand their organization’s reach beyond their 
delegated authority to increase their profits and influence at the detriment of the 
principal.8 Fourth, the relationships between principals and agents are shaped by the 
information shared between the two parties. Both principals and agents may have more 
information about themselves that the other is unaware of, therefore enabling one or both 
 
5 Krahmann, Elke. “NATO contracting in Afghanistan: the problem of principal–agent networks.” 
International Affairs, Volume 92, Issue 6. November 2016. P. 1404. 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=457c8f84-6062-
4197-8f26-c57d6ef1e22d%40pdc-v-sessmgr06 
6 Byman, Daniel, Sarah Kreps. “Agents of Destruction? Applying Principals-Agent Analysis to State-
Sponsored Terrorism.” International Studies Perspectives. February 2010. 11, p 3. 
7 Krahmann, Elke. “NATO contracting in Afghanistan: the problem of principal–agent networks.” 
International Affairs, Volume 92, Issue 6. November 2016. P 1413. 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=457c8f84-6062-
4197-8f26-c57d6ef1e22d%40pdc-v-sessmgr06 
8 Byman, Daniel, Sarah Kreps. “Agents of Destruction? Applying Principals-Agent Analysis to State-




parties to withhold information.9 That being said, the agents have a greater ability to 
prevent their principals from being able to fully monitor or control their behavior by 
misstating or hiding their own actions.10 Both parties go into these arrangements knowing 
the other may have a hidden agenda or other intentions. This awareness is known as 
‘adverse selection’. This concept refers to a situation where one party may have more 
information than the other, or vice versa, which allows one or the other to have a greater 
advantage.  
 
Most principal-agent relationships are based on the prospect of mutual gains, though at 
certain times, those benefits can divert from one another. Byman’s idea of delegation 
means that the principals will grant some level of autonomy to its agent, which as one 
could imagine causes several concerns from the standpoint of the principal. D. Roderick 
Kieiet and Matthew McCubbins have summarized the inherent flaws of delegation 
through their economic theory in the following way: 
 
Delegation…entails side effects that are known, in the parlance of 
economic theory, as agency losses. There is almost always some conflict between 
the interests of those who delegate authority (principals) and agents to whom they 
delegate it. Agents behave opportunistically, pursuing their own interests subject 
only to the constraints imposed by their relationship with the principal.11 
 
 
9 Rauchhaus, Robert. “Principal–agent problems in humanitarian intervention: moral hazards, adverse 
selection, and the commitment dilemma.” International Studies Quarterly 53: 4. 2009. p. 872. 
10 Krahmann, Elke. “NATO contracting in Afghanistan: the problem of principal–agent networks.” 
International Affairs, Volume 92, Issue 6. November 2016. P 1413. 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=457c8f84-6062-
4197-8f26-c57d6ef1e22d%40pdc-v-sessmgr06 
11 Byman, Daniel, Sarah Kreps. “Agents of Destruction? Applying Principals-Agent Analysis to State-




Their perspective is that an agent should behave as the principal would if they were in the 
same position. This point of view seems more idealist than realistic in many situations, 
therefor may be an expectation that is not always met. Failure in the principal-agent 
relationship is often because of the agent’s actions deviating from the preferences of the 
principal and can result in suboptimal results from the standpoint of the principal.12 This 
diversion of priorities can often encourage risk-taking by the agent, which can lead to 
unintended consequences like direct confrontations with the adversary.  
 
In summary, the literature on the principal-agent theory helps to construct a framework to 
better analyze the costs and benefits of this arrangement for both the principal and agent. 
To balance the costs and benefits of this relationship, principals must find a way to 
entrust their delegation of authority they have provided to their agent and vice versa.13  
 
What are Private Military Companies (PMCs)? 
 
PMCs are at times without patriotic loyalty, because they are in the business of making 
money by providing security services and personnel for war. As the world witnessed in 
the mid-2000s with organizations like Blackwater, Inc. in Iraq, these types of 
organizations are sometimes hard to control once on the battlefield and present a whole 
host of issues for their patrons/principals. Scholars going back centuries have written 
about the use of mercenaries, which are similar but different from PMCs. Whereas a 
 
12 Byman, Daniel, Sarah Kreps. “Agents of Destruction? Applying Principals-Agent Analysis to State-






mercenary can be an individual offering their skillsets for hire to engage in combat, 
PMCs are generally formally organized private companies that provide armed combat or 
security services for financial gain. There have been common themes throughout history 
that have shown that whether it be war during the Middle Ages or a modern 21st century 
battlefield, the same issues and problems remain, often causing confusion or even 
betrayal between principals and their agents. The use of mercenaries and paid combat 
forces as a tool of warfare is as old as war itself.14 
 
PMCs are used around the world. P. W. Singer, author of Corporate Warriors: The Rise 
of the Privatized Military Industry, says "In geographic terms, it operates in over 50 
countries. It’s operated in every single continent but Antarctica."15 Singer states that in 
the 1990s there used to be 50 military personnel for every 1 contractor, and now the ratio 
is 10 to 1.16 He also points out that these contractors conduct a number of different jobs 
depending on whom they have been hired by to perform the work. In some countries that 
have natural resources like oil, gas, and mineral deposits, they are hired for security 
purposes. 
 
When the average American thinks of PMCs they often think of groups like Blackwater 
who were used in the later stages of the second Iraq War and were highly criticized for 
their aggressive and sometimes illegal acts. Since that time, PMCs have proliferated 
 
14 Dodenhoff, George H. “A Historical Perspective of Mercenaries.” U.S. Naval War College. March 1969. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44641084.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae0a968e307bc7ae39d75b43b9872f6
54 
15 Singer, P.W. “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.” Penguin Books. 
November 2007. 




around the world and have been used by many countries to help them achieve their 
geopolitical objectives. PMCs are often mentioned with mercenaries, but there are some 
subtle differences. One of the main differences is that PMCs are usually formal business 
structures whereas mercenaries are often individuals offering their combat skill sets. 
 
Since 1977 and with the signing of Article 47 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, 
the most widely accepted definition of a mercenary in international law states: 
 
1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of 
war.  
2. A mercenary is any person who:  
a. is especially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;  
b. does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;  
c. is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private 
gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material 
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar 
ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;  
d. is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a Party to the conflict;  




f. has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty 
as a member of its armed forces.17 
 
One of the most well-known scholars in the Western world, Niccolò Machiavelli, a key 
figure of the Italian Renaissance, whose work is still studied by scholars, politicians, and 
professors alike, had strong negative views of mercenaries. Machiavelli referred to them 
in his well-known book, The Prince, published in 1532.18 He states his personal disdain 
for mercenaries in chapter XII of The Prince: “Concerning Various Kinds of Troops, and 
Especially Mercenaries”: 
  
“Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state 
based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, 
ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly 
before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and [one’s 
own] destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is 
robbed by them, and in war by the enemy.19 
 
 
In his analysis, he fails to talk about how paid troops and their patrons can both stand to 
benefit financially by using their contracted services in addition to the benefit that 
plausible deniability can provide to a leader.  
 
 
17 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). June 8, 
1977,” Geneva, Switzerland, May 2010. www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0321.pdf 
18 Dodenhoff, George H. “A Historical Perspective of Mercenaries.” U.S. Naval War College. March 1969. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44641084.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae0a968e307bc7ae39d75b43b9872f6
54 




According to Sean McFate, mercenaries and PMCs are the result of the marketization of 
war, where military force is bought and sold like other commodities, often to the highest 
bidder, and may times without patriotic loyalties. Though once negatively defined as 
money grabbing villainous outlaws, mercenaries are emerging from the shadows to once 
again become a mainstream instrument of world politics.20 Observing mercenaries 
through McFate’s concept of commodification and marketization, a principal must 
consider how their agents may find other profit-making opportunities where the 
principal’s oversight is less or their delegation of authority was more. McFate highlights 
these concerns through his detailed definition of what a PMC is in the 21st century. He 
characterizes them in several way including; they are motivated more by profit than 
politics; they are structure as businesses, and some of the large PMCs have even been 
traded on Wall Street and the London Stock Exchange; they are expeditionary in nature; 
they typically deploy force in a military manner as opposed to law enforcement; they are 
lethal and represent the commodification of armed conflict.21 For the purpose of this 
study, McFate provides the most specific and easily identifiable definition of what a PMC 
is in the 21st century. 
 
Scholars such as Jurgen Brauer, an economist and contributor to the growing field of 
peace economics, which is the study of economic aspects of peace and security says 
mercenaries should be observed through an economic perspective and suggests applying 
 
20 McFate, Sean. “Return of the Mercenaries.” Aeon. January 25, 2016. https://aeon.co/essays/what-does-
the-return-of-mercenary-armies-mean-for-the-world 
21 McFate, Sean. “Mercenaries and War: Understanding Private Armies Today.” National Defense 





an economic analysis when analyzing their behavior. His writing advances the argument 
that the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ may be less clear than originally 
thought, and that the most pressing issues concern the monopolization and legitimization 
of force, not whether it is a private or public entity. When looking at a country like 
Russia where finite economic resources are one of the main drivers for their growing use 
of PMCs like the Wagner Group. 
 
It is important to understand the concept of a PMC to see that their number one priority, 
by design, is not to be a patriotic force, but rather to make a profit. Though it may very 
well be possible that those common motivations exist, a PMC is designed to profit from 
the business it conducts, which is of course, war. It is imperative that readers begin this 
study by having a common understanding of how and why PMCs are used by their 
principals. As previously discussed, these relationships often have quite different 
motivations to exist whether it be U.S.-Blackwater or Russia-Wagner Group. Each of 
these has a distinctive reason and motivation to work with the other. 
 
PMCs have become more well-known in recent times, especially following their use by 
the United States during the Iraq War in the mid-2000s. Although their use is not new for 
countries like Russia and formerly the Soviet Union, analysts must note this trend and 
explain how PMCs fit into the concept of grey-zone and hybrid warfare. One attraction to 
their use by nation states is that these agents provide the plausible deniability desired by 
their principals and provides a type of covert nature of the agent’s actions. For example, 




the Wagner Group in places like Libya, Syria, and Ukraine while also denying any 
Russian government involvement in these conflict zones. PMCs are often difficult for 




Through the analysis of the data collected, the outcome of this study is like to show that 
the Wagner Group has become more independent in its own delegation of combat and 
security forces, especially as it has gotten further away from Russian government 
oversight. Specifically, the data is likely to show that when the Wagner Group began 
operating in Ukraine in 2014, it was under a stricter Russian command and control 
apparatus. As Russia’s presence has grown in Syria and throughout Africa, it is likely the 
data will show Wagner Group acted more independently and outside its delegated 
authority, causing a repeated divergence from the Kremlin’s priorities. Because of these 
actions and behavior, it is likely we will find that Wagner has lost considerable support 




This research looks at several different geographic locations over the last seven years 
each as their own case study to analyze how the Wagner Group’s behavior in various 
geographic locations has affected their relationship with the Russian government and 




through the prism of the principal-agent problem. The study was done using a qualitative 
approach. Because the principal-agent theory began within economic scholarship, much 
of the existing scholarship on this subject is quantitative. It is used to understand the 
dynamics that occur between a principal – “any individual or organization that delegates 
responsibility to another in order to economize on transaction costs, pursue goals that 
would otherwise be too costly, or secure expertise”22 – and an agent – an actor or 
organization given authority to undertake certain actions.23 By analyzing the principal-
agent relationship, the study looks at how the delegation of authority or the lack thereof 
from the Russian government to its agent, the Wagner Group, changes over time and 
geographies.  
 
The principal-agent theory is applied to the data by first identifying what the Russian 
government’s and the Wagner Group’s objective is in each location and identifying 
instances where the agent, Wagner Group, has veered off from that mutual understanding 
of their role. This will show when the principal-agent relationship has been strong and at 
which moments in time there has been a breakdown between the two because of the 
agent’s miss appropriated delegated authority.  
 
It should be stated upfront, that it is not easy to get details on these murky non-
transparent Kremlin-associated, oligarch controlled organizations within Russia, like the 
Wagner Group. Most of the data collected for this study has come from the work of 
 
22 Kassim, Hussein and Anand Menon. “The principal-agent approach and the study of the European 





investigative journalists, think tank researchers, and publicly released information by the 
United States Department of Defense. It has been a difficult task for reporters and 
researchers to closely track the group, which is exactly what it and the Kremlin intend. 
Some of the data used in this study was collected by the New America research 
organization who attempted to track and record the digital data on individual members of 
Russian-backed paramilitary groups and the oligarchs who support them.24  
 
The data provides examples of how the Wagner Group has made operational decisions 
that are clearly for the sole benefit of their own bottom line and profits rather than for the 
stated policy or objective of the Russian government.  
 
In summary, by gathering data on certain events that have taken place in Ukraine, Syria 
and throughout Africa, the study will analyze how the Wagner Group’s behavior has 
changed over time and especially as it has conducted operations further outside of the 
Kremlin’s control and oversight. After analyzing the data, the study should show us how 
and in what ways the Wagner Group’s behavior has affected the principal-agent 
relationship. The hypothesis’ accuracy will be shown through the examination of the 
Wagner Group’s actions to identify if their behavior changed as they gained more 




24 Rondeaux, Candace. “Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security 







This study used data from a selection of primary and secondary sources in both English 
and Russian, which were translated through Google Translate. Please note that there are 
certain limitations using this tool, so there may be some translation issues. 
Background on the Wagner Group’s Yevgeny Prigozhin  
 
Understanding the Wagner Group requires first taking a close look at its founder, 
Yevgeny Prigozhin, his position inside Putin’s oligarch-controlled regime, and how the 
pursuit of power and profit drives his stewardship of delegation of authority provided by 
the Kremlin. He is the primary financier and manager of Wagner, although he has always 
denied any and all association with it.25 Prigozhin is also often referred to as “Putin’s 
chef” because he has multiple businesses associated with the Kremlin, including food 
service and catering contracts. He made his fortune running these catering businesses in 
the 1990s, which is how his nickname came about. He slowly joined President Vladimir 
Putin's elite circle of oligarchs when the Russian leader started dining at his luxury 
floating restaurant in St Petersburg, called New Island.26 
 
In an August 2020 piece published by the investigative organization, Bellingcat, it was 
reported that Prigozhin’s disinformation and military operations have been closely 
 
25 Reynolds, Nathaniel. “Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner 
Group.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. July 2019. 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/07/08/putin-s-not-so-secret-mercenaries-patronage-geopolitics-and-
wagner-group-pub-79442 






integrated with Russia’s Ministry of Defense, specifically its intelligence arm, the GRU.27 
In addition to other services provided, it appears through their investigation that 
Prigozhin uses his various companies to launder money for government-supported 
overseas operations.28 
 
Like many other Russian oligarchs, Prigozhin has his hands in various lines of 
businesses, using shadowy offshore firms to control his assets. Several of those 
businesses are in addition to his catering contracts he maintains with the Russian 
government. One of those is the Internet Research Agency (IRA), which is the Russian 
organization that interfered in the U.S. 2016 presidential election. He is also believed to 
have multiple international mining and natural resource extraction firms, and now the 
Wagner Group.  
 
Prigozhin has made huge personal and professional financial gains through his sprawling 
business empire. His catering business alone has provided meals to millions of soldiers, 
policemen, government lawyers, hospital patients, and schoolchildren for a large tax-
funded haul of up to $3 billion since 2011.29 Prigozhin’s Wagner Group forces have been 
active in Ukraine, Syria, Venezuela, Central African Republic (CAR), Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Libya and other locations. His most recent foreign activity has 
 
27 Bellingcat. “Putin Chef's Kisses of Death: Russia's Shadow Army's State-Run Structure Exposed.” 
Bellingcat. August 14, 2020. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2020/08/14/pmc-structure-
exposed/ 
 
28 Bellingcat. “Putin Chef's Kisses of Death: Russia's Shadow Army's State-Run Structure Exposed.” 






been primarily focused in Africa, where he also provides political consulting services 
(including meddling in elections) on behalf of the Kremlin or corrupt regimes on the 
continent.30  
 
Prigozhin’s motivations are largely tied to ensuring his continued membership in Putin’s 
court. By using Wagner and the IRA troll factory to support Putin’s domestic and 
geopolitical objectives - and prove his personal worth - Prigozhin can strengthen his 
claim on valuable state resources and power.31 As with all of Russia’s oligarch, the more 
Prigozhin pleases Putin, the more he gets in return. At the same time, Putin always looms 
above Prigozhin as with all oligarchs Russia, presiding over the broader system of 
control. Wagner cannot exist without Putin’s blessing, and Prigozhin probably needs the 
Kremlin’s approval for strategic-level decisions, like when and where Wagner is 
deployed.32 
 
In addition to providing mercenary forces to fight on behalf of the Kremlin’s geopolitical 
objectives, Prigozhin uses his connections to profit from natural resource extraction in 
areas where Wagner operates. This started in Syria in 2016–2017, when the Bashar al-
Assad regime agreed to pay for their services. The agreement allowed Prigozhin’s 
company one-quarter of the profits from oil and gas fields it helped seize on behalf of the 
 
30 Reynolds, Nathaniel. “Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner 
Group”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. July 2019. 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/07/08/putin-s-not-so-secret-mercenaries-patronage-geopolitics-
and-wagner-group-pub-79442 
31 Reynolds, Nathaniel. “Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner 







Assad regime.33 This arrangement benefited all three parties involved; it took financial 
responsibility away from the Russians by finding an alternative revenue source to pay for 
Wagner’s services, it provided Wagner an additional revenue source, and gave the 
Syrians the additional forces it needed to reclaim some of its lost territory. Such was the 
success of this arrangement in Syria that later when Wagner began work in Sudan and the 
Central African Republic, the Kremlin government helped negotiate contracts on their 
behalf for the mining rights of potential diamond and gold deposits.34 These sorts of 
arrangement appear to have developed over time, once the Kremlin realized how they can 
effectively use Wagner forces for their own geopolitical benefit while at the same time, 
have the local regime pay for their services. This arrangement becomes a win-win for the 
Kremlin. These sorts of joint-ventures between the Kremlin and oligarchs like Prigozhin 
benefit both parties within the principal-agent relationship, by providing continuous 
profits for the Wagner Group in return for assisting the Kremlin’s foreign policy 
objectives.  
 
The group may not offer the Kremlin new ways to wage war or build influence, but its 
existence is an example of how a more assertive Russia often tries to evade responsibility 
for actions beyond its borders. Wagner is also a window into the broader dynamics of the 
Putin regime, including how it harnesses the ambitions and self-interests of elites like 
Prigozhin to create deniable and flexible tools.35 
 
33 Ibid. 
34 Reynolds, Nathaniel. “Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner 








Recent History of PMCs in Russia 
 
Following the Cold War, there was a major growth in the private military and security 
services industry. They became well known during America’s wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Russia was not different by following this trend of privatizing combat forces. Russia 
has created its own flavor of PMCs and that rather than utilizing their services solely 
based on the economic benefits, they see them as unique and strategic tools of Russian 
influence throughout the world. Highlighted in 2009 by Anna Borshchevskaya, special 
operations units from the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) were put under the direct 
command to Chief of Staff Nikolay Makarov. A year later, Makarov publicly spoke about 
the need to use private military companies “for delicate missions abroad.”36 The idea 
became a reality and in April 2012, when then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was asked 
in the Russian Duma about his support for creating a network of Russian private military 
companies, he responded affirmatively and emphasized that PMCs could be tools of 
influence abroad, allowing the realization of national interests without the direct 
involvement of the state.37 
 
Background on the Russia-Wagner Group Relationship 
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The Wagner Group is a privately-held Russian PMC that has become a prominent tool for 
the Kremlin’s geopolitical adventurism throughout the world following their invasion 
into Ukraine in early 2014.  
 
According to Mikhail Zygar, the former editor of Russia’s independent TV news channel, 
Putin had informed President Bush in 2008 at the NATO Summit that: “If Ukraine joins 
NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions. It will simply fall apart.” 
Following through with his statement in February 2014, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine 
triggered the greatest security crisis in Europe since the end of Cold War. It became a 
battleground in 2014 when Russia illegally annexed Crimea and began arming and 
abetting so-called separatists in the Donbas region in the country’s southeast. Russia’s 
seizure of Crimea was the first time since World War II that a European state annexed the 
territory of another.38 Putin’s Russia has become a revanchist power, by trying to reclaim 
territory in it near-abroad and within its small sphere of influence “It was always Putin’s 
goal to restore Russia to the status of a great power in northern Eurasia,” Gerard Toal,  an 
international affairs professor at Virginia Tech said. Supporting the so-called separatists 
there, has empowered Russia to gain leverage over Ukraine, ultimately preventing it from 
joining the European Union or even more concerning to Russia, NATO membership.  
 
Wagner Group was originally organized through ad hoc decision making and developed 
as the Kremlin looked for advantageous and politically palatable ways to fight the wars in 
 






Ukraine and Syria in 2014–2015,39 and ultimately to spread Russian influence beyond 
those two locations into dozens of other places. As a formal matter, PMCs are illegal 
under the Russian constitution, which reserves all matters of defense, security, and 
foreign policy for the state.40 
 
Though likely partially funded by Prigozhin, and likely indirectly by the Kremlin, the 
day-to-day operation are believed to be run by Dimitriy Valeryevich Utkin, who was 
previously a lieutenant colonel and brigade commander of a Russian special forces 
(spetsnaz) unit that is part of Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).41 An 
example of how close the Russian state and the Wagner Group are with one another, 
someone does not have to look much further than their shared base in Molkino, Russia. 
What makes this basing arrangement so unusual is that it is operated jointly by the 10th 
Separate Special Purpose Brigade of Russia’s GRU and the Wagner Group.42 After 
passing the first checkpoint guarded by GRU soldiers, if one drives left, they will come to 
the GRU facility, while the road on the right leads to the Wagner barracks.43 
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Moscow first sent the Wagner Group to Ukraine when it needed to fight a covert war, 
have plausible deniability, hide casualty numbers from the Russian public, and minimize 
the consequences it may face from the international community as a result of its gross 
violation of its neighbor’s sovereignty. By using so-called volunteers and other groups of 
irregular forces like PMCs in Ukraine, the Kremlin was able to reduce the number of 
active duty troops deployed there, allowing them to conceal their presence.  
 
After conducting operations in the eastern Donbas region by aiding the so-called 
separatist forces in the self-declared Donetsk and Luhanks People’s Republics, the 
Kremlin started to demobilize some of these irregular groups forces, as the war slowed to 
a simmer. But the Russian intervention in Syria gave Wagner new life just as business 
slowed in Ukraine. At the time, the Russian General Staff of the Armed Forces saw this 
as an opportunity to push forward its long-standing plans to create a structured and 
professional permanent PMC force. By turning Wagner into its vision of its desired PMC, 
the General Staff saw them as a way to help Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian forces on the 
ground and to reduce public acknowledgement of casualties.44 
 
The Wagner Group’s Role in Syria  
 
The Kremlin’s decision to intervene in Syria in 2015 resulted from a confluence of 
geopolitical events and military conditions on the ground. The conflict offered Russia the 
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opportunity to utilize its military and updated weapons systems that it had been 
modernizing for the last decade. Russia officially launched its airstrikes in Syria in 
September 2015, but Russian advisors had actually been on the ground assisting Syrian 
President, Bashar al-Assad’s forces for at least a year. In addition to filling the vacuum 
that had been left in the region as the United States pulled its combat forces out of Iraq, 
Moscow’s true objective was to gain enough influence and maintain its close relationship 
with its client state, Syria. Although it was fairly risky to intervene, the benefits were 
seen to eventually outweigh the risks. Although they did see a risk with the proliferation 
of ISIS, their larger goal was to be seen on the world stage as directing a political 
settlement in Syria, showing Russia’s status as a global power. Russia has now been 
formally involved in combat operations within Syria for over five years, with not sign of 
leaving soon. 
 
By 2015, Wagner forces were operating on the ground in Syria. During these operations, 
the Syrian army was supported by Russian military aviation, while Wagner mercenaries 
were on the front lines with disparate Arab groups. In Syria, the Wagner Group provided 
primarily four functions as a ground force: First, it showed it could be successfully 
employed in military-related tasks alongside Bashar al-Assad’s forces. Second, it could 
be used jointly or in conjunction with regular Russian military troops such as spetsnaz 
and the Aerospace Forces for intelligence gathering and reconnaissance. Third, this force 




another useful area of application for Wagner has been training local forces allied with 
the regime.45  
 
The peak of the Wagner Group’s success in Syria was the capture of Palmyra in 2016, in 
which Wagner's fighters played a decisive role.46 This was considered such a huge 
success for the Wagner Group, that the Kremlin even invited Wagner’s leadership to 
attend a reception with Russian government leadership, including Vladimir Putin, for the 
Heroes of the Fatherland on December 9, 2016.47  
 
The Principal-Agent Problem in Syria  
 
On February 7, 2018 there was a major battle in Deir Ezzor, Syria between American 
Special Forces guarding a Conoco gas plant, U.S.-supported Syrian Defense Forces 
(SDF), and the Wagner Group. It risked sparking a serious escalation between U.S. and 
Russian forces in Syria. The Russian mercenaries began their approach by crossing the 
internal deconfliction line in eastern Syria that had been agreed to by U.S. and Russian 
forces in 2015.48 At the time, American forces were trying to get in touch with their 
Russian counterparts, requesting the attack be immediately halted, but it continued 
anyway. U.S. forces used the previously agreed upon Syria deconfliction line to try and 
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communicate with Russian military commanders in Syria “before, during, and after the 
strike,” according to the Pentagon, and were later “assured by the Russians that there 
were no Russians involved,” then-Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis said.49 But since U.S. 
commanders were closely following the progress of the attacking mercenary forces as 
they crossed the de-confliction zone, it is clear that Russian military intelligence in the 
region was aware of the group’s movements. The attack was reportedly not sanctioned by 
the command of the Russian group of forces in Syria, according to two unnamed sources 
in the Russian MoD, according to a journalistic investigation by the independent Russian 
website The Bell. The military was "just dumbfounded" by this willingness to engage in 
such a brazen act, according to one source identified.50 A few days later, the Russian 
Foreign Ministry had to admit that Russian citizens who were not associated with the 
Russian armed forces participated in the battle but that it was not the business of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assess the legality and legality of such decisions.  
 
In later interviews, Wagner forces disputed the military’s claim of ignorance and voiced 
suspicions that Russian officers let U.S. forces decimate Wagner fighters to embarrass 
Prigozhin.51 One former member even claimed that a Russian military officer pledged air 
cover for the operation, but nothing materialized.52 In Syria, Wagner eventually took on 
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two roles, one for itself and one for the Kremlin. Its own priority was seizing and 
defending oil and gas assets, in which Prigozhin had a financial stake in while the other 
was to fight alongside pro-Assad forces to gain back territory lost by the regime.53 It 
seems as though Wagner Group was diverging from the delegated authority it had been 
given by the Kremlin. As a result of this behavior, the Russians responded in kind by 
disregarding the Wagner Group’s interests.   
 
At another time, Wagner forces posted self-incriminating videos into semi-public online 
forums, where they chronicled the torture, murder and beheading of a Syrian civilian near 
Palmyra.54 Another bad public relations moment for the Russian government that put 
their propaganda outlets on overdrive to crowd out the bad news story. 
 
Immediately following the February 2018 attack, the Russian MoD had a period of time 
where it attempted to keep Prigozhin at an arm’s length as they have found him and his 
group’s behavior not always helpful in their efforts. The MoD officials even allowed for 
their contracts with Wagner to dry up, to force Prigozhin to go and find his own contracts 
outside of the Russian government and with weak regimes.55 The Russian military 
leadership has little respect for him and do not think he understands combat because he 
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interference of a profit-seeking oligarch into areas where there are ongoing Russian 
military operations. Russian MoD leaders have anonymously reported that they have 
concerns that Russia could face a situation like it did in Ukraine, where oligarchs 
(according to the Russian analysts) raised militias that “dictate” government policy.56 
Russian commanders might have been worried that an oligarch like Prigozhin could 
dictate policy and could therefor lead Russia into unwanted conflicts.57 The military 
perceives much of the oligarch class such as Prigozhin as thoroughly corrupt and not well 
intentioned for Russia’s national security, but rather at further lining their own pockets. 
Additional disputes between Prigozhin and military leadership included a disagreement 
with Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reportedly over to whom Putin should give 
credit for military successes in Syria.58 Amid growing tensions between the two men, the 
military’s deliveries of weapons and supplies to Wagner dried up, as did the lucrative 
defense contracts that had been flowing to Prigozhin’s companies. This was not a 
complete breakdown, however, as the Kremlin’s needs demanded some cooperation 
between the military and Wagner.  
 
There are two reasons that the Russian military has been dissatisfied with Prigozhin. The 
first is highlighted in Russian reporter Denis Korotkov’s statement from August 2017, six 
months before the Deir Ezzor event. He said, “In 2016, according to all our sources, there 
 
56 Rondeaux, Candace. “Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security 
Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare.” New America. November 2019. 
57 Falichev, Olev. 2016. “Oxhrana Dlya Karmana [A Guard for the Pocket].” Voenno-promyshlennyi 
Kur’er (11), March 23, 2015. (Translation by Google Translate). 
58 Reynolds, Nathaniel. “Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner 






was very close cooperation (between Wagner and the Russian Defense Ministry) at all 
levels: aviation-artillery support, weapons supplies, military hardware, ammunition, and 
evacuation of the wounded…. At some point in 2017, the support suddenly dried up, 
especially when it came to weapons. Everyone was fairly surprised that the cash 
allowance dried up suddenly.”59 The second are reports that in 2017 the MoD started 
refusing to pay Prigozhin for catering and cleaning contracts he had with the military. 
Four of his companies filed suit against the Defense Ministry to have the contracts 
enforced, and three of them were ordered by the courts to be fully or partially repaid.”60 
As with all levers of government in Russia, Putin could have ultimately gotten involved 
to ensure such an outcome for his friend, Prigozhin, but the data does not exist in the 
public domain. 
 
Africa – Course Correction in the Relationship 
 
Much like Syria, Russian foreign policy in Africa is about taking advantage of dangerous 
conflict zones to gain access, create financial opportunities, and increase influence. Since 
the end of 2017, Wagner personnel have begun to appear in various countries around 
Africa. These developments show the transformation of how Wagner Group conducted 
its business and was further utilized by the Russian government. Similar to the deal 
Prigozhin has with Assad, The Bell reported that Prigozhin met with Sudanese authorities 
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to make a deal for the extraction of gold in exchange for the training of the regime’s 
army. These sorts of business arrangements would not be made without the blessing of 
the Kremlin. Within a year, Russia was suspected of sending troops to Libya, and soon 
thereafter, Prigozhin was caught on video participating in a meeting with the Libyan 
Armed Forces High Command and as it turned out, he was personally present at the talks 
in Moscow between Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Libyan National Army 




Photo: Yevgeny Prigozhin is in the back left of the photo. The video screenshot is from the Information Bureau of the 
Libyan Armed Forces High Command – November 7, 201862 
 
In Libya, the Kremlin was more than happy to fill the vacuum left by the United States 
and its NATO allies, becoming friendlier with Egypt and the Emirates, and to position 
Russian firms for commercial gain. Until Turkey’s recent escalation in Libya within the 
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last year, Russian involvement there carried few direct risks because of its reliance on 
Wagner the Kremlin could keep costs low and maintain a degree of deniability.63 
 
Wagner Group has expanded its operations into Sudan, Central African Republic (CAR) 
and Libya, where it protects Prigozhin’s investments. Again, another example how 
Prigozhin’s top priority remains his bottom line over the specific geopolitical aims of the 
Russian Federation.  
 
Wagner’s utility continued to be expendable and a deniable tool of Prigozhin’s public-
private partnership with the Kremlin as was shown again in Mozambique in 2019. 
Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi visited Russia in August of 2019 and signed 
agreements with Putin on mineral and energy exploration as well as defense and security 
cooperation. Within one month of that agreement, Wagner personnel were already 
deployed to Mozambique to help tamp down an Islamist antigovernment insurgency in 
the north of the country, where significant deposits of natural gas are located.64 This 
provides another example of how the Kremlin can greatly expand its influence in both 
economic and security terms while not having to use Russian forces on the ground, but 
instead use Wagner Group who can gain its pay through resource extraction. For the three 
parties involved, this looks like an attractive arrangement. 
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It is important to note that the Wagner Group’s deployments throughout Africa in places 
like Sudan, Mozambique, CAR, Madagascar, and others represent an important evolution 
for the group. Prigozhin learned from his profitable arrangement with Bashar al-Assad 
and has used that template and his organizations to control the valuable natural resources 
including gold, diamonds, and oil. In some of these locations, Wagner is not necessarily 
even operating in an active combat role like it had previously done in Ukraine and Syria. 
Instead, it has been a security provider to important assets, projects, and high level 




Libya has been in turmoil since the Arab Spring in 2011 and when a NATO-led 
intervention ultimately toppled longtime dictator Moammar Gaddafi. The most recent 
civil war has been a long simmering situation with multiple nation-state actors becoming 
more involved by providing growing support to proxies within the north African country. 
One side is a Tripoli-based Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Government of National 
Accord (GNA) based in the western part of the country and led by Prime Minister Fayez 
al-Sarraj. The United Nations recognized the GNA as the legitimate government but has 
been largely supported by Turkey and less overtly by Qatar. As Turkey has been the most 
prominent supporter of the GNA, it has regularly sent advanced weaponry and personnel 
to support their forces in Libya. In the eastern part of the country is the Libyan National 
Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar, who is supported by the Russians, Egyptians, France, 





In October 2018, British intelligence officials said that two Russian military bases 
had been set up in Benghazi and Tobruk, located in eastern Libya to support Field 
Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces. The bases were set up under the auspices of the Wagner 
Group but it has been reported that there were also 'dozens' of GRU personnel and special 
forces members present on the base providing training to Haftar’s forces.65 At this same 
time, Russian Kalibr missiles and S-300 SAM systems were also seen set up in Libya.66 
 
The head of the Russian contact group on intra-Libyan settlement, Lev Dengov, 
said that the comments by the British intelligence officers did not "correspond to reality", 
although RBK TV also confirmed the Russian military deployment to Libya.67 By spring 
of 2019, when Haftar’s forces were making large advances in the southern part of the 
country, they were able to capture Libya's largest oil field, known as the El Sharara, with 
the help of Wagner Group forces.68 These kinds of captured oil assets serve both the 
Russians and the Wagner Group financially. By summer of 2019, the Al Jufra airbase 
was reportedly turned into a Wagner Group command center for operations to take wider 
control of the country's southern oil fields.69  
 
As Libya continues to be under a UN arms embargo, U.S. Africa Command 
(AFRICOM) on May 26, 2020 said it had assessed that Russia had recently sent military 
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jets to Libya via Syria to support the Wagner Group and Haftar’s LNA forces. It said the 
jets were repainted in Syria to remove Russian Federation Air Force markings.70 In a 
tweet on May 27, AFRICOM added that 14 MiG-29 and Su-24 fighters bearing Russian 
Federation Air Force markings departed Russia “over multiple days in May.”71 Russia, as 
usual, denied the claim and called it “disinformation.”72 General Stephen J. Townsend, 
AFRICOM’s commander said, “It would be Russian mercenary pilots flying Russian 
supplied aircraft to bomb Libyans.” On that same day, AFRICOM posted on its Twitter 
account.  
 
“Over multiple days in May, Russian MiG 29s and SU-24 fighters 
departed Russia. At that time, all the aircraft have Russian Federation Air Force 
markings. After they land at Khmeimin Air Base in Syria, the MiG 29s are 
repainted and emerge with no national markings. They are flown by Russian 
military members & escorted by Russian fighters based in Syria to Libya, landing 
in Eastern Libya near Tobruk for fuel. At least 14 newly unmarked Russian 
aircraft are then delivered to Al Jufra Air Base in Libya.”73  
 
 
Other than the public reporting by AFRICOM, there were no other sources available to 
confirm that the aircraft were in fact flown by mercenary (Wagner Group) pilots rather 
than active Russian Air Force officers. 
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U.S. AFRICOM’s official Twitter page – July 15, 202074 
 
Only six weeks later in July, AFRICOM reported finding crude types of indiscriminately 
planted anti-personnel land mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). AFRICOM 
verified photographic evidence that shows “indiscriminately placed booby traps and 
minefields” around the outskirts of Tripoli and all the way east toward the strategic 
coastal city of Sirte since mid-June.75 They also assessed that the Wagner Group was 
responsible for introducing these weapons into Libya. “Imagery and intelligence 
assessments show how Russia continues to interfere in Libyan affairs.76 Wagner Group’s 
reckless use of landmines and booby traps are harming innocent civilians,” said Rear 
Admiral Heidi Berg, AFRICOM’s director of intelligence. According to the U.S. 
Department of Defense, these escalations had not been seen before the summer of 2020. 
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AFRICOM posted the photos shown below of improvised explosive devices and a 
concealed anti-personnel mine, allegedly found in a residential area in Tripoli. 
 
In July, 2020 U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Bradford Gering, director of operations, U.S. 
AFRICOM said, “The Russian-state sponsored Wagner Group is demonstrating a total 
disregard for the safety and security of Libyans The Wagner Group’s irresponsible tactics 
are prolonging conflict and are responsible for the needless suffering and the deaths of 
innocent civilians. Russia has the power to stop them, just not the will.”77 It is important 
to understand the possible bias AFRICOM may have in choosing to label Wagner Group 




This study hypothesized that as the Wagner Group became more independent and 
dispersed in more diverse locations around the world that it would act more 
independently from the objectives of the Kremlin. Throughout the research, the data 
revealed a great deal of concern about the Kremlin-Wagner relationship within the 
leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense, including the Defense Minister. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis assumed there would be greater friction within the principal-
agent relationship, especially when the Russians saw the Wagner Group’s actions 
possibly bring them into a kinetic confrontation with American forces in Syria. After full 
review and analysis of the data, it is evident that the principal-agent problem did not 
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permanently affect the continued relationship in ways predicted, because Putin was 
always there to ensure Prigozhin’s and Wagner’s continued contracts, at some points 
even having his own government negotiate on their behalf in other countries.   
 
It is important to note that Wagner did clearly threaten the principal-agent relationship 
with the actions it took in Deir Ezzor in 2018, as the data shows the Russians did not 
overtly approve of the operation – though they did not speak out against it either. The 
Deir Ezzor event is the most important data point in this study because it perfectly 
exhibits the principal-agent problem that existed between the Kremlin and the Wagner 
Group. The principal-agent problem in this scenario exemplifies the conflict of priorities 
Prigozhin and Wagner created for their principal. The problem is clearly showing the 
agent, Wagner Group, acting in a way that is contrary to the best interests of the 
principal, Russia. It was clear that Wagner acted in its own self-interest and went outside 
the bounds of the delegated authority it had been given by Russia in Syria. Their desire to 
capture the Conoco gas plant overrode their consideration for their principal, which was 
to avoid the Americans and continue to reclaim land captured by Syrian rebels. In the 
aftermath of Deir Ezzor, Prigozhin reportedly had to convince angry Kremlin aides that 
the mistake would not happen again.78  
 
This incident immediately raises the question of why Wagner ground commanders to 
believe it was a good idea to attack a base with U.S. forces. Was the motivation of 
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additional revenue so strong that they were willing to go outside of their delegated 
authority and attack the gas plant on their own because of profit-driven desires? Based on 
the Russian military’s reaction, it appears to be the latter of the two.  From the data, it 
appears that Wagner chose to attack the gas plant and as a result there was a total 
breakdown of the principal-agent relationship. Following this apparent breakdown of 
support by the Russian MoD for Wagner forces in Syria, operations were considerably 
reduced and affected as its support declined and Prigozhin developed more commercial 
financial pursuits for the group.  
 
An unfortunate reality for the Wagner Group forces from the Deir Ezzor fiasco is that the 
Russian military may have sacrificed the lives of their fellow countrymen and veterans 
who work for Wagner as a way to send Prigozhin a message. According to Russian 
reporter, Dmitry Gorenburg, it may have been reprisal for the believed to be theft from 
MoD budgets, or Prigozhin’s previously successful lawsuits over military catering 
contracts.79 
 
The principal-agent theory is an important and effective framework through which to 
investigate this murky and concealed relationship. It has provided a lens to analyze the 
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What has been so beneficial about this arrangement for the Russian government is that it 
gets an off the books combat force and in recent situations has set it up so that another 
government or regime is paying for their services, while the Kremlin is benefitting from 
the gained influence within these countries. Second, the Kremlin can deny responsibility 
for Wagner by keeping it outside state control. Putin himself argued in a 2018 interview 
that Russia has no responsibility for what Prigozhin does because he has no official 
position.80 
 
This study further solidifies the understanding that Vladimir Putin is the ultimate 
decisionmaker within the Russian government, even when the most senior level of the 
MoD has grown frustrated and tired of the Wagner Group’s actions. Though it is well 
known, this study provides further evidence confirming that to be a successful oligarch in 
Russia, one must ensure their relationship with Putin is maintained over any other senior 
principal in the government. Prigozhin knows his efforts and actions must always be tied 
to Putin’s desires. By using Wagner and the Internet Research Agency to support Putin’s 
domestic and international goals, Prigozhin is constantly attempting to strengthen his 
claim on profitable contracts paid by both the Russian government and others while 
ensuring his place within Putin’s court. As with all powerful oligarchs in Russia, the 
more he does for Putin, the more he gets in return. At the same time, as the principal in 
this dynamic, Putin has always had the luxury of being the final decision maker as to who 
can operate on the Kremlin’s behalf and has such as been delegated that authority. As 
 
80 Reynolds, Nathaniel. “Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner 






Prigozhin well knows, Wagner like other entities can only capture more contracts with 










Ukraine To keep Ukraine 
within its sphere of 
influence by 
preventing it from 
joining the EU and 
eventually NATO 
To support the 
Russian Government 
objectives and provide 
combat ready forces to 
fight in Crimea and 
Eastern Ukraine 
Agreement 
Syria To ensure Bashar Al-
Assad’s regime does 
not fall; maintain its 
only military bases on 
the Mediterranean  
To support Russian 
Government 
objectives, but also to 
find other lucrative 
business opportunities 
primarily in the oil 
and gas industry  
General agreement, 
but Wagner Group 
was at times diverged 





on their role in Syria 
Libya Gain a military 
foothold in North 
Africa and on the 
Mediterranean by 
supporting Gen. 




Provide combat ready 
forces to Gen. Haftar 
and to capture and 
protect energy 
infrastructure that can 







After full review and analysis of the data, it is evident that the principal-agent problem 




there to ensure Prigozhin’s and Wagner’s continued contracts, at some points even 
having his own government negotiate on their behalf in other countries.   
 
The Wagner Group has offered the Russian government a form of power projection that it 
would otherwise not have in warzones around the world. This one capability alone gives 
an economically weak Russia, a powerful hand to play in the international system. By 
using these forces, Russia has been able to pursue its objectives that the Russian military 
could neither afford financially nor geopolitically survive by putting their own regular 
troops on the ground. The Wagner Group will continue to be used for deception and 
deniability reasons on a vast scale throughout the world. By the Russian government 
claiming no relationship with the Wagner Group, it provides legal loopholes that permit 
PMC groups handpicked by the Kremlin to perform a run around national and 
international prohibitions against mercenary activity. By utilizing these groups, which are 
illegal under the Russian constitution, the Kremlin can simply continue to deny having 
any involvement with or idea what they are doing in these various locations.  
 
This study has effectively shown many examples of both. But it is clear that the Kremlin 
and Putin himself find many more benefits than costs by using the Wagner Group. 
Looking into the future, one should expect to see the continued proliferation of 
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